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Abstract
Safety is an important requirement for many modern systems. To ensure safety of complex critical systems,
well-known safety analysis methods have been formalized. This holds in particular for automation sytsems
and transportation systems. In this paper we present the formalization of one of the most wide spread safety
analysis methods: fault tree analysis (FTA). Formal FTA allows to rigorously reason about completeness
of a faulty tree. This means it is possible to prove whether a certain combination of component failures
is critical for system failure or not. This is a big step forward as informal reasoning on cause-consequence
relations is very error-prone.
We report on our experiences with a real world case study from the domain of railroads. The here presented
case study is – to our knowledge – the ﬁrst complete formal fault tree analysis for an inﬁnite state system.
Until now only ﬁnite state systems have been analyzed with formal FTA by using model checking.
Keywords: fault tree analysis, dependability, safety analysis, formal methods
1 Introduction
Many critical accidents in the last years show that the risk modern systems bring is
rising (e.g. the recent accidents in china’s chemical plants or the german ICE acci-
dent at Eschede). As a result safety is becoming a more and more important issue in
system development . At the same time new systems become increasingly complex.
This makes safety analysis both more important and more diﬃcult. Therefore new
and better analysis methods must be developed. One such technique is formal FTA.
FFTA is a formal variant of well-known FTA. The beneﬁt is, that cause-consequence
relations between component failure and system failure can be rigorously proved.
This is less error-prone than informal reasoning and yields much better results.
In this paper we present the ﬁrst formal fault tree analysis of an inﬁnite state
system, the problems we faced and the lesson we learned. We use the formal fault
tree semantics of [14]. Veriﬁcation was done with the KIV system [2]. This case
study can also be seen as a guideline on how to do formal FTA in an interactive
veriﬁcation environment. From a safety point of view the problems and solutions
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found in the presented case study are exemplary for a big group of safety critical
systems.
In Sect. 2 we give a brief introduction on FTA, summarize the formal semantics
and revisit the semantics of Harel’s state charts [9]. Sect. 3 presents a real world
case study from the domain of railroads. Learned lessons are presented in Sect. 4.
A conclusion and an outlook is given in Sect. 5.
2 Formal Fault Tree Analysis
A well-known safety analysis technique is fault tree analysis (FTA, [16]). FTA was
developed for technical systems to analyze if they permit a hazard (top event). The
top event is noted at the root of the fault tree. Events which cause the hazard
are given in the child nodes and analyzed recursively, resulting in a tree of events.
Each analyzed event (main event) is connected to its causes (sub-events) by a gate
in the fault tree (see Fig. 1). An AND-gate indicates that all sub-events are neces-
sary to trigger the main event, for an OR-gate only one sub-event is necessary. An
INHIBIT-gate states that in addition to the cause stated in the sub-event the con-
dition (noted in the oval) has to be true to trigger the main event. The inhibit gate
is more or less an AND-gate, where the condition does not have to be a fault. The
leaves of the tree (basic events) are failure modes at component level. These failures
have to occur in certain combinations (corresponding to the AND/OR structure of
the tree), before the top event can occur i.e. the system fails. An example fault
tree is shown in Fig. 8.
event
AND-gate
OR-gate
INHIBIT-gate
basic event
Fig. 1. Fault Tree Symbols
A combination of basic events which leads to the hazard is called a cut set. A
minimal cut set is a cut set which can not lead to the top level hazard, if only one
event of the set is prevented. A typical example is that in redundant systems for
system failure it is necessary that the primary and the secondary unit fail (for e.g.
the electric and the hydraulic braking module). This information helps to identify
failure events whose exclusion secures the system. If for example one event occurs
in diﬀerent minimal cut sets, the probability of the top level hazard will strongly
decrease, if this event can be excluded.
Minimal cut sets can be computed from fault trees by combining the primary
events with boolean operators as indicated by the gates. A minimal cut set then
consists of the elements of one conjunction of the disjunctive normal form of the
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Gate ITL-formula Gate ITL-formula
ϕ2ϕ1
D
ψ
x (ψ → ϕ1 ∨ ϕ2)
ϕ2ϕ1
C
ψ
¬ (¬ x (ϕ1 ∨ ϕ2) ; i ψ)
ϕ2ϕ1
D
ψ
x (ψ → ϕ1 ∧ ϕ2)
ϕ2ϕ1
C
ψ
¬ (¬ x (ϕ1 ∧ ϕ2) ; i ψ)
ϕ2ϕ1
AC
ψ
¬ (¬ x ϕ1 ; i ψ)
∧ ¬ (¬ x ϕ2 ; i ψ)
χ
ϕ
D
ψ
x (ψ → ϕ ∧ χ) χ
ϕ
C
ψ
¬ (¬ x (ϕ) ; i ψ)
∧ ¬ (¬ x (χ) ; i ψ)
Fig. 2. Formal semantics of fault trees
resulting formula.
For formal FTA, each gate is represented by an interval temporal logic (ITL)
formula. Temporal formulas in ITL are built from ﬁrst-order formulas using propo-
sitional connectives and the following temporal operators 1 : i ϕ (“in all initial
intervals ϕ”), x ϕ (“in all subintervals ϕ”), i ϕ (“in some initial interval ϕ”), x
ϕ (“in some subinterval ϕ”), and ϕ ; ψ (read ϕ chop ψ: “the interval can be split,
such that ϕ holds in the first part and ψ in the second”).
The formalization of FTA showed, that deﬁning the semantics of an OR-gate
simply as a disjunction is insuﬃcient, since it does not take into account that the
sub-events (causes) usually happen before the main event (consequence), and that
events may have duration. Therefore, it is necessary to distinguish decomposi-
tion gates (D-gates) with boolean semantics and cause-consequence gates (C-gates),
which describe temporal dependencies. This results in 7 types of gates. The gates
and there formalizations are shown in Fig. 2. For example the FTA formula for
D-gates (left column) and C-gates (right column) are shown.
D-OR- and D-AND-gates ( D , D ) can be deﬁned canonically: for example
the D-AND-gate ( D ) states, that whenever the eﬀect ψ happens, both causes
ϕ1 and ϕ2 must happen as well. A C-OR-gates ( C ) states, that it must not be
possible to split a run, such that none of the causes ϕ1 and ϕ2 ever happens in the
ﬁrst half, but the consequence ψ happens at the beginning of the second half. In
other words: if the consequence happens, one of the causes must have happened
before (completely, if it has duration, therefore the chop is necessary). Causes
and consequences must not overlap. The asynchronous and synchronous C-AND-
1 ITL also deﬁnes quantiﬁcation and many other derived operators not needed here. More information may
be found in [1]
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gates ( C , AC ) are similar, they require that both causes must have happened (at
the same time) before the consequence. The conditions for D-INHIBIT- and C-
INHIBIT-gates ( D , C ) are the same as for the D-AND-gate and AC-gate.
Hansen et al. [8] deﬁnes cause-consequence gates in Duration Calculus (DC,
[17]), but their deﬁnition does not meet the requirement, that causes are completed
before the consequence. A subsequent publication [7] is restricted to decomposition
gates. Bruns and Andersen [4] also deﬁne a fault tree semantics using μ-calculus.
They also distinguish between cause-consequence and decomposition gates. Only
events without duration are considered. For this special case, our semantics is
equivalent (see [15] for details).
For the semantics in Fig. 2, the following theorem was proven:
Theorem 2.1 (minimal cut set theorem) If all conditions of a fault tree are
veriﬁed, and if for each minimal cut set at least one of its basic events is prevented
from happening, then the top-level event will never happen.
This means in practice, that if you verify for every gate in the fault tree the cor-
responding formula, then you can be sure, that you have not forgotten any branches
in the fault tree (i.e. no combination of failure modes has been ”overlooked”).
In other words, it is suﬃcient to prevent only one primary event of each minimal
cut set, to avoid system failure. A complete fault tree is therefore a partial proof
for the safety of the system. It shows what combinations of component failures are
necessary reason for system failure. The completeness theorem also gives formal
justiﬁcation for the use of minimal cut sets in quantitative safety analysis, even for
cases where timing conditions are relevant [13].
The theorem is proved using structural induction over the size of the fault tree.
The basic fact underlying the proof is transitivity of the cause-consequence rela-
tion. The proof was done formally with the KIV system ([2]), using an algebraic
speciﬁcation of the syntax and semantics of continuous Interval Temporal Logic.
2.1 State charts
In this paper systems are modeled as state charts. State charts exist in several dif-
ferent variations. The most commonly known are UML state charts and Statemate
state charts. For Statemate state charts a formal semantics has been deﬁned by
Harel and Damm [6]. In this paper Statemate state charts are used as system mod-
els. This semantics has been integrated in a model checking extension to Statemate
[3] and is also supported by the interactive theorem prover KIV [2].
State charts may be seen as an extension to traditional state-transition-systems.
A single state chart comprise a set of (sub-)state charts, a set of labeled transitions
and an initial state. Figure 3 shows a very basic state chart.
The state chart My Chart has two (sub-)state charts: State A and State B. A
transition from State A to State B happens if and only if, the event ev is triggered
and the condition cond holds. If the transition is taken, the action act will be
executed. The diﬀerence between events and conditions is that events are only one
time step active (there is no event queue like in UML state charts) while conditions
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My_Chart
State_A State_B
ev[cond]/act
Fig. 3. A basic state chart
may be arbitrary (non-temporal) formulas. Thus conditions may in general hold
several time steps. Act is a C-like program which is executed atomically when
the transition is taken. If several transition are simultaneously possible, then one
will be chosen indeterministically. A more detailed description of the semantics of
Statemate state charts may be found in the tool’s documentation or in [6].
For the purpose of formal proofs events and conditions may be treated analo-
gously. From now on we write event ∧ cond/act for event[cond]/act. If no action
is deﬁned we simply write event ∧ cond. If no condition and no event is guarding
the transition (spontaneous transition) then we use /act. Unlabeled transitions are
spontaneous transitions with no action deﬁned.
3 A case study
As an example for the application of formal FTA, we present an analysis of a radio-
based railroad crossing. The case study was done using the interactive theorem
prover KIV [2] and the proof eﬀort was about 1.5 person months. This case study
is the reference case study of the german research councils (DFG) priority program
1064. This program aims at bringing together ﬁeld-tested engineering techniques
with modern methods of the domain of software engineering.
The German railway organization, Deutsche Bahn, prepares a novel technique
to control railroad crossings: decentralized, radio-based railroad crossing control.
This technique aims at medium speed routes, i.e. routes with maximum speed of
160 km/h. An overview is given in [10].
radio communication
central office
route
profile defects
Fig. 4. Radio-based railroad crossing
The main diﬀerence between this technology and the traditional control of rail-
road crossings is that signals and sensors on the route are replaced by radio com-
munication and software computations in the train and railroad crossing (see Fig.
4). This oﬀers cheaper and more ﬂexible solutions, but also shifts safety critical
functionality from hardware to software.
Instead of detecting an approaching train by a sensor, sending this information
to a central oﬃce which closes the railroad crossing, the train continously computes
F. Ortmeier, G. Schellhorn / Electronic Notes in Theoretical Computer Science 185 (2007) 139–151 143
the position where it has to send a signal to secure the level crossing. This eﬀectively
saves money (not so much equipment on the track is needed) and removes the central
control oﬃce (this is a single point of failure for all trains in the region). To calculate
the activation point the train uses data about its position, maximum deceleration
and the position of the crossing. Therefore the train has to know the position of the
railroad crossing, the time needed to secure the railroad crossing, and its current
speed and position. The ﬁrst two items are memorized in a data store and the
last two items are measured by an odometer. For safety reasons a safety margin is
added to the activation distance. This allows compensating some deviations in the
odometer. The system works as follows:
The train continuously computes its position. When it approaches a crossing, it
broadcasts a ‘secure’-request to the crossing. When the railroad crossing receives
the command ‘secure’, it switches on the traﬃc lights, ﬁrst the ‘yellow’ light, then
the ‘red’ light, and ﬁnally closes the barriers. When they are closed, the railroad
crossing is ‘secured’ for a certain period of time. The ‘stop’ signal on the train route,
indicating an insecure crossing, is removed and substituted by computation and
communication. Shortly before the train reaches the ‘latest braking point’ (latest
point, where it is possible for the train to stop in front of the crossing), it requests
the status of the railroad crossing. When the crossing is secured, it responds with a
‘release’ signal which indicates, that the train may pass the crossing. Otherwise the
train has to brake and stop before the crossing. The railroad crossing periodically
performs self-diagnosis and automatically informs the central oﬃce about defects
and problems. The central oﬃce is also responsible for repair and provides route
descriptions for trains. These descriptions indicate the positions of railroad crossings
and maximum speed on the route. The safety goal of the system is clear: it must
never happen, that the train passes a crossing which is not secured.
A well designed control system must assure this property at least as long as no
component failures occur. The corresponding hazard is “a train passes the crossing
and the crossing is not secured”. This is the only hazard which we will consider in
this case study
3.1 The formal model
In the following part a brief description of the state chart model of this system is
given. Note, that the model not only includes intended behavior but failure modes
as well. This is necessary for all types of formal safety analysis. Details on how
such models may be derived from functional models of the intended behavior may
be found in [12] and [11].
The model of the radio-based railroad crossing is split in three parallel charts.
One chart models the crossing another one models the communication and a third
models the train. These three charts are explained below.
3.1.1 Model of the crossing
The state chart in ﬁgure 5 shows the model of the crossing which is reacting to the
signals sent by the train. Initially the crossing is in state Opened, which means
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Closed
Closing_Count = 0
Crossing
Closing
Closed_Count = 0
Opened
Unwanted_Open
Error_Closed
Closing Count ≥ T Max Closing /
Close Request Rcv /
Closed Count ≥ T Max Closed
Pos > DS ∨
SR CROSSING: Status Request Rcv ∧ (Closed ∨ ) / Release Snd
Fig. 5. Model of the crossing-chart
the bars are open. When the crossing receives the signal Close Request Rcv from
the train, it goes into state Closing. This activates a timer called Closing Count
which simulates the time needed for turning on the light signals at the crossing and
the closing of the bars. This takes the time (T Max Closing). After the expiration
of this time the crossing is closed (state Closed). Another timer Closed Count is
started to assure that the bars are not closed too long. This is a standard procedure
in railroad organization. The crossing reopens if either the train passes the danger
spot (Pos > DS) or the timer reached T Max Closed. The crossing also opens
its bars if a fault in the sensor, which detects the passing of the train, occurs
(Unwanted Open). The response of the crossing on the train’s status request is
modeled by a static reaction (SR CROSSING). If it receives a status request
(Status Request Rcv), a release message (Release Snd) will be sent if the bars are
closed (intended behavior) or if there is a faulty detection at the sensor for the bars’
position (Error Closed).
3.1.2 Model of the train
The model of the train is divided into two parts: one for modeling the physics of
the train and one for modeling the controller logic. From a theoretical point of
view, it is advisable to model the control and the physics of the train separately.
But in this example, the physical model consists only of some static reactions (see
ﬁg. 6). These static reactions basically state, that the position of the train updates
according to the speed and that the speed updates according to the acceleration.
So for an easier representation these two parts have been combined.
The train control supervises the position of the train, issues closing requests to
the crossing and ultimately decides, if an emergency stop is necessary or not. The
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train control is implemented in software on-board the train. The formal model is
given in ﬁgure 6. Starting from its initial state Idle the chart goes into state Wfc
(’wait for close’), when the train approaches the crossing and the control sends a
close request (Close Request Snd) to the crossing. The point when this signal is
sent is continously calculated depending on the actual speed, estimated closing and
communication time, and the maximum deceleration of the train. This is modeled
in the predicate Close(Pos, V,AccMAX ,DS). Some time later, the train reaches
another virtual control point which is also calculated continously and modeled in
predicate Request(Pos, V,AccMAX ,DS). This is the position when the train sends
a status request (Status Request Snd) to the crossing. The control is then in state
Wfs (’wait for status answer’). If the train receives a release signal within the next
Wfs Count time units the controller will go into state Go and the train may pass
the crossing. Otherwise an emergency stop must be issued. In this case the brakes
are activated (A = AccMAX) and the controller goes into state Brake. A failure of
the brakes is also modeled. If the brakes fail, the controller will still go into state
Brake, but there will be no real deceleration. The two states Brake and Go are
ﬁnal states of the chart, so they won’t be left anymore.
Train−Control
Idle
Brake
Train
Close_Request_Snd
Wfc
Wfs_Count = 0
Wfs
Status_Request_Snd
Release_Rcv Go
SR_TRAIN: Tick / Pos := Pos + V ; if V > A then V := V − A else if V > 0 then V := 0
Wfs Count > 1 ∧¬ Error Brake /
Wfs Count > 1 ∧ Error Brake
Close(Pos, V, AccMax, DS) /
Request(Pos, V, AccMax, DS) /
A = AccMax
Fig. 6. Model of the train-control-chart
3.1.3 Model of the communication
The communication is modeled by three static reactions, see ﬁgure 7. These
static reactions represent the function and disfunction of the communication. The
functional communication relays all incoming messages, e.g. (SR COMM1) the
close request of the train (Close Request Snd) is forwarded to the crossing as
Close Request Rcv. If the communication fails (Failure Comm) then no mes-
sages will reach their receiver. The other two static reactions represent the status
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request (SR COMM2) and the release message (SR COMM3).
Communication
SR COMM2: Status Request Snd
SR COMM1: Close Request Snd
SR COMM3: Release Snd
∧¬ Failure Comm
∧¬ Failure Comm
∧¬ Failure Comm / Release Rcv
/ Close Request Rcv
/ Status Request Rcv
Fig. 7. Model of the communication-chart
3.2 Fault Tree Analysis
This model is now analyzed with formal FTA (see Sect. 2). The interesting hazard
is a situation, where a train passes the crossing, while the bars are not closed. We
will call this hazard ”collision”. The fault tree for this hazard is shown in ﬁgure 8.
gate−7
too short
gate−1
a)
b)
gate 2
gate 3
gate−4
gate−5 gate−6
D
D
D
D
of barsensors
faulty positionsignal opening because of 
sensorfault
gate−8
train at dangerspot,
train at dangerspot,
release signal sent
train at dangerspot,
crossing not closed,
crossing not closed
crossing not closed,
gate−9
D
sensorfault
opening because of 
Timeout
crossing is opening, 
release signal sent
train at dangerspot,
brakingtime brake faulty
crossing not closed,
0,
crossing not closed
release signal send
CC
no release signal received
C
C
train has not reached ds, train has not reached ds, 
c)
o)n)
k)j)j)i)
g)f)
d)
m)l) train at dangerspot, A train at dangerspot, A = 0,
emergency brake, 
no release signal received
emergency brake,
no release signal received
no release signal received
train at dangerspot, h)
no release signal received
train at dangerspot, 
e)
emergency brake,
=
Fig. 8. Fault tree for hazard collision
The top event of the fault tree (collision) may have two diﬀerent causes. One is
that the train passes the crossing, while the bars are not closed, although no release
signal has been sent. The other is a situation where the train passes the crossing,
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while the bars are not closed, but a release signal has been sent. The ﬁrst cause
corresponds to a misbehavior of the train and the second to one of the crossing. The
”or” relationship is modeled by a decomposition gate. These two diﬀerent situations
must be further analyzed.
The left node — train passes the crossing (while the crossing is not closed)
although no release signal has been received, is caused by a failure in the train’s
behavior, so no information about the crossing is needed. This is phrased by a D-
INHIBIT-gate. The right node, train passing the not closed crossing and a release
signal has been sent, can be caused by two diﬀerent situations. One is given by the
train approaching the not closed crossing and the release signal is being sent (while
the crossing is not closed). The reason for this can be a fault in the position sensors
of the bars 2 . The other possible reason is, that the bars open after a release signal
has been sent but before the train has passed the crossing. The reason for this can
be either a timeout or a faulty request to open the bars.The other cause is given by
the train passing the opening/opened crossing and the signal has been sent some
time before.
As an example, the formalization of the ﬁrst three nodes is shown in table 1.
Informal node formalization
train at danger spot and Pos < ds ∧ ds ≤ Pos + V ∧
crossing not closed ¬Closed
train at danger spot and Pos < ds ∧ ds ≤ Pos + V ∧
crossing not closed and ¬Closed∧
no release signal received ¬Release Signal Rcv
train at danger spot and Pos < ds ∧ ds ≤ Pos + V ∧
crossing not closed and ¬Closed∧
release signal sent Release Signal Snd
Table 1
Formalization of fault tree nodes
The resulting proof obligation is then constructed by inserting these formal
descriptions of the nodes into the D-OR-gate formula of Fig. 1. The other fault
tree gates are handled analogously. The fault tree above has been proven complete.
This means that for every gate the corresponding proof obligation has been shown.
The conclusion is, that – for this example – all minimal cut sets are single-point-of-
failures. So there is no redundancy in the system. On the other hand the fault tree
also shows, that if these failures are prevented then the hazard will not occur. In
other words if nothing fails, the system will work as intended or even shorter: the
2 or if SIMULTANEOUSLY with the train status request a (faulty) request to open the bars reaches the
crossing. This branch of the faulty tree will usually only be found with formal FTA. It is not detected with
informal FTA.
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system is functionally correct.
4 Lessons learned
As already mentioned in the abstract the here presented case study is to our knowl-
edge the ﬁrst formal safety analysis of an inﬁnite state system. In this section we
will brieﬂy present our experiences with proving FTA formulas over an inﬁnite state
model. To prove the correctness of the fault tree, we used KIV [2] as an interactive
veriﬁcation tool.
One big advantage of the KIV system is, that it natively supports state charts as
speciﬁcation mechanism. The state chart model shown in section 3 can be directly
used as a system speciﬁcation in KIV. The proof obligations are derived from the
fault tree as shown in the previous section. They can also be generated by the
fault tree module of KIV. KIV allows to prove temporal properties with symbolic
execution and induction [1]. This means every temporal formula is split into a
predicate logic part and some property which must hold from the next step onwards.
In practice this results in stepping through all reachable states of the state chart
until a loop is found and induction can be applied. State explosion can be avoided
by generalization. Generalization means that instead of prooﬁng a formula a more
general theorem is proven. The starting formula is then a specialization of the more
general theorem. This type of strategy often helps when verifying interactively.
Altogether the case study required an eﬀort of about one and a half person months.
We made the following experiences during this case study:
FFTA proofs are easy, but time consuming. Almost all proof steps can
be done automatically. Only ﬁnding adequate generalizations and identifying the
correct inductive argument (i.e. the corresponding state) requires human interaction
and skill. In most cases, generalizations can only be found manually. In particular
for big proofs it can be very time consuming to ﬁnd this position (i.e. the part of
the proof where a similar subgoal had already been proven) in the proof tree. For
locating the correct spot it seems to be possible to use hash functions. This will
make state chart proofs much easier and faster.
Generalization are a great help, but are not easy to be found (see above).
It is clear that the more generalizations are made in the more possible successor
states will be possible in and vice versa. For example if you analyze a deterministic
state chart, then with no generalization each step in time will result in exactly one
new state. If you generalize this state chart (i.e. you throw away all information on
the current) state, then you will get all possible states as possible candidates for the
next step in time. In many cases even this ”brutal“ generalization can be helpful
(i.e. if you have to prove that the train moves in one direction). Although you can
get as many as 200 case distinctions in your proof, the KIV system can close all of
them with its built-in predicate logic simpliﬁer.
This leads to two approaches to prove FTA properties: depth-ﬁrst-search and
breath-ﬁrst-search. Depth-ﬁrst-search is more useful as an strategy, if it is unclear
if a proof obligation holds or not (i.e. if the nodes of the fault tree have been
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formalized correctly or not). This is useful in particular to validate a formula and
ﬁnd faults early. Breadth-ﬁrst search is in general faster, but will only discover
speciﬁcation errors at the very end. But for some properties it is even possible to
fully generalize the state of the system and close the proof in one step.
Formalizing FTA nodes is diﬃcult. Even for simple systems it can be
very hard to correctly formalize the nodes of the fault tree. This is because the
informal understanding of a fault tree (decomposition of causes into components)
is not enough for a formal description. This problem can be attenuated if all proof
obligation are at the beginning validated with depth-ﬁrst-search. It is our experience
that this additional eﬀort is really worth the time, because formalizing nodes of a
fault tree is very error-prone.
5 Conclusion
We showed the ﬁrst veriﬁcation of an inﬁnite state system with FTA. Our Experi-
ences show, that formal FTA with interactive veriﬁcation is a promising, but not an
easy topic. Many problems arise from speciﬁcation errors. These problems may be
countered with good methodology. Compared to other formal safety analysis meth-
ods, formal FTA is the only one which has a human readable and understandable
logic background structure and will thus be more easily accepted in industry than
push-the-button techniques (like pure model checking).
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